
Model Of The Civil Society Movement Post-Military Coup Myanmar

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Abstract

This research is motivated by the overthrow of the civilian government of Myanmar by the military junta on February 1, 2021. After the military coup, millions of civilians staged peaceful demonstrations throughout the country and protested for the return of a democratically elected civilian government. The pro-democracy community's rejection of the military coup gave rise to a civil society movement in Myanmar that aims to restore democracy in Myanmar. This research is qualitative and uses a descriptive method. In this study, the authors explain the model of the civil society movement in Myanmar after the military coup that occurred in 2021. The data used by the authors is secondary data. The study results found that the 2021 military coup led to a bottom-up movement by the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and a top-down movement by the People Defense Force (PDF). Even though the two have differences in their origins, movement patterns, and types of movements, CDM and PDF still have the same goal: to reject the military coup and restore democracy in Myanmar.

Keyword: CDMs; Civil Society Movement; PDFs; Myanmar,

Abstrak

Penelitian ini dilatarbelakangi oleh penggulingan pemerintah sipil Myanmar oleh junta militer pada 1 Februari 2021. Setelah kudeta militer, jutaan warga sipil melakukan demonstrasi damai di seluruh negeri dan memprotes kembalinya pemerintahan sipil yang terpilih secara demokratis. Penolakan komunitas pro demokrasi terhadap kudeta militer memunculkan gerakan masyarakat sipil di Myanmar yang bertujuan untuk memulihkan demokrasi di Myanmar. Penelitian ini bersifat kualitatif dan menggunakan metode deskriptif. Dalam penelitian ini, penulis menjelaskan model gerakan masyarakat sipil di Myanmar pasca kudeta militer yang terjadi pada tahun 2021. Data yang digunakan penulis adalah data sekunder. Hasil kajian menemukan bahwa kudeta militer 2021 berujung pada gerakan bottom-up oleh Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) dan gerakan top-down oleh People Defense Force (PDF). Meski keduanya memiliki perbedaan asal, pola gerakan, dan jenis gerakan, CDM dan PDF tetap memiliki tujuan yang sama: menolak kudeta militer dan memulihkan demokrasi di Myanmar.

Kata kunci: CDM, PDF, Myanmar, Gerakan Masyarakat Sipil

INTRODUCTION

Myanmar's politics has experienced many ups and downs in implementing

democracy. During its decades of independence, Myanmar has struggled with military rule and military coups. The 1962 coup led by General Ne Win replaced the country's representative

democracy with 26 years of military rule. Then, 25 years later, the ruling military also rejected the landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 elections until the NLD finally won again elections in 2015 and 2020 and a parliamentary victory of 25 votes. Many years later, Over 100,000 votes The party that ended military rule in Myanmar won 80% of the vote (Khaldun, January-June 2021).

The NLD's victory in the 2020 election received a lawsuit from the military due to suspicions of fraud in the election process, which the NLD later denied. Until early 2021, the military under General Min Aung Hlaing broke into the Presidential Palace and carried out the early morning arrests of President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as several other high-ranking officials in the capital Naypidaw on February 1, 2021, on charges of fraud in the elections to be held in November 2020 (Nihriroh & Faustina Ivana Sari Dewi Janugroho, 2021). The arrests were followed by several announcements, including the state of emergency in Myanmar for one year, the takeover of civilian government by the military would be carried out within one year by making General Min Aung Hlaing the supreme commander of the Tatmadaw, then be given full power over government in Myanmar. In addition, the Tatmadaw appointed First Vice President U Myint Swe as President of Myanmar. In addition, the Tatmadaw stated that it would hold free and fair re-elections after the state of emergency was over.

However, Myanmar's political modality after the 2021 military coup differs significantly. It is because before the military coup occurred, the people of Myanmar had experienced a system of democracy and freedom, the freedom to disseminate and receive information, the freedom to convey ideas, to the freedom of economic opportunities under a democratic government. So, people refuse to return to military rule for decades, even though the Myanmar military sees that military rule is their natural prerogative and is a normal condition for Myanmar. So the opposition to the coup and the rejection of military rule has become a decisive

factor in uniting people across the country and, most importantly, pushing the different resistance forces together.

It is this condition that makes it possible for the National Unity Government (NUG), as the government of the legitimate republic of Myanmar and formed by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which consists of members of parliament elected during the 2020 general election with authority granted by the mandate of the people to overthrow the military dictatorship and restoring democracy in Myanmar with its armed wing, the People Defense Force (PDF). PDF is an armed group formed in 2021 to fight against public violence and military attacks. PDF and NUG distinguish this conflict phase from previous struggles in the last three decades, with their roles as different security actors with new political objectives. PDFs are labeled "defensive people's war" (Hein & Myers, 2021). Despite their initial lack of tools, sophisticated command structures, and international support, the PDF has thrived and demonstrated considerable tactical understanding and resilience today.

In addition, the military takeover of the civilian government led to protests by millions of civilians holding demonstrations across the country and protesting for the return of a democratically elected civilian government (Nihriroh & Faustina Ivana Sari Dewi Janugroho, 2021). The massive street protests that emerged nationwide in the weeks following the coup were carried out by tens of thousands of people from all walks of life who were members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). However, under the leadership of General Min Aung Hlaing, the military junta forces have committed mass killings, torture, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests, and other violations committed against protesters, journalists, lawyers, health workers, and members of the political opposition, which amounted to crimes against humanity. (Human Rights Watch., 2022)

The Myanmar military forces use the "Four Cuts" strategy (Human Rights Watch., 2022). This strategy includes limiting access to food,

funds, intelligence, and recruitment. Implementing this strategy aims to starve the bases supporting the armed resistance and make civilians turn against the civil resistance groups. Kim Jolliffe, a researcher focusing on conflict and security in Myanmar, argued that implementing this strategy destroys civil society and threatens the leading resources on the battlefield. In addition, military groups carried out air attacks, shelling, and arson attacks on several towns and villages in ethnic Kayah, Kayin, Kachin, and Chin countries, as far as the Sagaing, Magway, and Thanintharyi regions (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Security forces killed over 10,000 people and detained thousands more civilians who participated in community protests, and public and private sector employees participated in protests against the military takeover. The military government cracked hard on anyone who opposed the coup by launching rubber bullets, tear gas, water cannons, live ammunition, and other lethal force against the protesters (Human Rights Watch, 2021). According to Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) (AAPP), military forces have killed at least 1,383 people, including 91 children, and as many as 11,289 people were arrested as of December 31, 2021 (Amnesty International).

In this study, the author realizes that this research cannot be separated from previous studies because issues related to the Myanmar Coup attract attention to be studied by researchers, so to maintain the authenticity of this research, the authors use some literature that has the theme similar research to be reviewed which will then be used as a reference in the work of this writing. As mentioned (Nihriroh & Faustina Ivana Sari Dewi Janugroho, 2021) And (Hidriyah, S, 2021) explains how the history of Myanmar went through various events as a process to create a democratic country free from military rule until another military coup in 2021. Then (Yasa, 2022) And (Wicaksono & Lutfi, 2022) of them explained the Myanmar coup using the perspective of international law, which in its completion was hampered by the rules of international criminal law contained in the UN

Charter and the ASEAN Charter. Here (Fauziah & Padmi, 2022), looking at political history up to the coup, democracy in Myanmar has always been hampered by the actions of the military junta that overthrew the civilian government. Those previous studies show that democracy in Myanmar is experiencing setbacks, where it is not stagnant or even experiencing development.

The military coup in 2021 gave rise to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) as a form of resistance from the people of Myanmar, as explained (Bahri, 2022). Demonstrations carried out by civil society led to acts of human rights violations, as in the research conducted by (Dilla & Prahara, 2022). However, even more exciting research conducted by (Rao & Atmakuri, The Role of Social Media in Myanmar's CDM: Strengths, Limitations and Perspectives from India, 2021) showed that the CDM movement in Myanmar was also carried out through social media, which would help with community protests at that time COVID-19 was spreading throughout the country. Still, the military tried to control the internet by completely shutting down the internet, which significantly affected the protest mobilization. (Tran, 2023) revealed that the need for protection and validation of the actions of activists fighting for democracy can indirectly affect the ongoing participation of activists. (Lukito, Cui, Hu, Lee, & Ozawa, 2022) Shows that in dealing with protests through social media, the Tatmadaw carried out propaganda such as spreading false election claims and trapping the Tatmadaw with a bastion of democracy. Tatmadaw propaganda negatively framed the protesters as rioters, rebels, and even terrorists.

As in the review of previous research, the author wants to provide renewal in this study, as previously explained that the process of democratization in Myanmar has always experienced government takeovers by the military, which in the end led to protests and movements initiated by the community to reject the military coup to the point of consuming many people. The military committed many human rights violations against anyone who took acts of resistance against the military. However, the military coup that occurred in

2021 gave rise to a new pattern of movements carried out by people who oppose the military coup against the civilian government of Myanmar, namely in addition to the existence of social movements that are members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), also gave rise to another movement by the People's Defense Force (PDF). This is what makes this research different from previous studies. This research will discuss the model of Myanmar's civil society movement after the military Coup 2021, which is emphasized by formulating the problem: "What is the Model of Myanmar's Civil Society Movement Post-Military Coup 2021?"

METHODS

This research is qualitative and uses a descriptive method. In this study, the authors explain how the PDF and CDM civil society movements took action to re-establish democratic governance in Myanmar. The author uses a literature study data analysis technique with data sources to be used by the author obtained from publications by international organizations, online news, journal articles, and other relevant documents such as information from ministries to reading books related to the relevance of the topics raised. This research focuses on Myanmar's PDF and CDM movements from 2021 to 2022.

Theoretical Framework

Social Movement Concept

According to Locher (2002: 231), when a group organizes themselves to encourage or resist some social change, they create a social movement. People with little or much political power join together to get or fight for several things, including social change; they are carrying out a social movement. According to Locher, most of the theorists of collective behavior view social movements as a type of collective behavior. However, many social movement theorists view social movements as separate from collective behavior. (Sukmana, 2016).

To see the difference between the New Social Movements (NSMs) with collective action and the old social movements (old social movements) is formulated as follows (Larana, 2009). First, a new social movement with a structural role from movement participants. The tendency of participants in the movement to spread and come from various social statuses such as youth, gender, to professionals. Second, there are ideological differences between opposing movements. Movements are characterized by conservative or liberal, right or left, and capitalist or socialist ideological characteristics. The Marxist view is more dominant in Europe than in America and has a paradigm to shape perceptions about the actions and behavior of bourgeois or proletarian groups. Whereas NSMs have more plural ideas and values, tend to have a pragmatic orientation, and seek to carry out institutional reform orientation in which the system opens up for member participation in decision-making. NMSs have a significant political meaning for Western society, and this is because it has implications for the dynamics of democratization and civic development with the political dimension of society.

Furthermore, Third, NMSs often lead to symbolic and cultural issues associated with issues of identity rather than complaints about the economy, such as the working class movement. Movements are grouped by beliefs, symbols, values, and meanings, which are interrelated with feelings toward different social groups. This corresponds to ethnic, separatist, and nationalistic movements within the country. Fourth, the relationship between individuals and groups is unclear. Movement does not have a basic structure and class, movement becomes the focus of understanding an individual, and action in the movement is a complex combination of individual identity assertion. Fifth, NMS' often involves personal aspects and is closely related to human life. Sixth,

Then Seventh, the emergence of the organization and development of the NMS's group is associated with a crisis of participation in Western democracy. This crisis has become the impetus for collective action in seeking

alternative forms of participation and decision-making related to issues of group interest. Eighth, NMSs are segmental, spread, and decentralized. There are many variations according to the type of movement, with a tendency towards greater autonomy at the local level, in which the movement's forms of decision-making often limit its relations with regional and national organizations.

The rejection of the people of Myanmar against the military coup has given rise to social movements carried out by all levels of society, which began with non-violent protests throughout Myanmar. They resisted change to return to military rule after years of living under the umbrella of democracy. The social movement in Myanmar gave rise to a new model compared to the movements carried out in Myanmar, namely the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDF) and the People's Defense Force. Both are social movements born of the same problem.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)

Appearing as the first act of defiance after the military coup on February 1, 2021, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is a general strike mobilization spearheaded by a combination of groups of civil workers and medical workers who were then followed by civil society (Bahri, 2022). CDM became the center of attention for all parties involved after the coup in Myanmar. For people who were against the coup and the military, the CDM was a form of anti-coup campaign and an institution that replaced the military-controlled administration. Meanwhile, for the military and pro-coup groups, the CDM is a threat to maintaining coercive and centralized power in the post-military coup era, and it is imperative to deal with this threat by taking the most substantial available measures. In the first week after the military coup, some civil servants and medical personnel refused to go to work, followed by a group of doctors from various hospitals who had networked and launched an online campaign condemning the military coup.

The day after the coup, health workers from around forty hospitals, medical institutions, and COVID-19 testing centers announced their decision to join the movement and stop indefinitely.

The movement gained momentum with the start of street protests as street protests intensified across the country following the protests led by Dr. Tayzar San in Mandalay and those led by Ei Thinzar Maung and Esther Ze Naw Bamvo in Yangon. Likewise, calls for the CDM and participation in the movement with slogans such as "say no to the military coup," "CDM," and "do not go to the office, go" were widely chanted during the protests.

In addition, the online campaign of several health workers attracted thousands of impressions and reactions from online social media users. The Civil Disobedience Movement Facebook page, posted on the afternoon of February 2, attracted more than 100,000 followers within hours. Two days after the coup, more than 110 public hospitals and health departments in 50 cities joined the campaign. Facebook and Twitter, and even Telegram are the primary sites for uploading and circulating pictures and videos of protests that have taken place throughout the country, as well as how the military has acted against protesters and journalists (Rao & Atmakuri, 2021). The protest by the community gave rise to a symbol of resistance adopted by protest groups against authoritarian rule in Asia, such as The Milk Tea Alliance, which was carried out by a group of young people in Myanmar using social media. The existence of social media makes it easier for the public to coordinate and mobilize acts of resistance. In addition, social media is used to gain international attention and increase international support (Rao & Atmakuri, 2021). As protests continue to move massively across the country, military actions are also widely shared on social media.

Weeks of peaceful protests turned deadly on February 20, 2021, when two unarmed protesters were killed by security forces in Mandalay City, including a 16-year-old boy. Under the leadership of Min Aung Hlaing,

military forces carried out shootings, arbitrary arrests, sexual harassment, and other violations committed against protesters, journalists, lawyers, officers, and health workers. In April 2021, more than 700 civilian deaths were due to military violence, while thousands more were arrested, imprisoned, and subjected to abuse. Strict measures were also taken by cutting off internet connections and closing the media to limit access to information.

Police and soldiers opened fire on the protesters in the streets, often shooting them in the head. Actions of defiance continued until then, but the intensity of the protests reduced due to a brutal crackdown by the military (Paddock, 2022). Security forces killed over 10,000 people and detained thousands more civilians who participated in community protests, and public and private employees participated in protests against the military takeover. The military government cracked down hard on anyone who opposed the coup by launching rubber bullets, tear gas, water cannons, live ammunition, and other lethal force against the protesters (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

On the other hand, wearing red ribbons as a sign of defiance, thousands of teachers and administrative staff from educational institutions and ministries echoed to leave their jobs. In the first week of May, the Myanmar Teacher's Federation (MTF) estimated that around 60% of the 35,000 tertiary education staff and 27% of the total 450,000 primary and secondary education workers joined the CDM. Students and teachers' unions also campaigned against the reopening of schools in June, claiming that the military is conducting propaganda through education to show that the country is returning to normal after the military coup despite the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak. As a result, about 90 percent of the 9 million elementary and high school students do not register for the new Batch.

Several civil servants from the Ministries of Transport and Communications, the Ministries of Electricity and Energy, the Ministries of social affairs, and the Ministries of Planning and Finance to employees of private and public

banks actively took part in the CDM campaign, which in turn led to the closure of the rail network, international airports, trade and banking system.



Source: Civil Disobedience Movement Facebook page

Figure 1 Number of Public Offices, Hospitals, and Schools Involved in the Five-Day Post-Coup CDM Campaign

The figure 1 shows that CDM has spread to 14 regions in Myanmar, namely Kachin, Sagaing, Shan, Chin, Mandalay, Magway, Rakhine, Bago, Kayah, Kayin, Ayeyarwady, Yangon, Moni, and Taninthary up to 87 communities in Myanmar. With the spread of the movement, these 14 regions have 100 government hospitals, 22 universities, and schools, as well as 16 ministries from various departments, including the Ministry of Health and Sports, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, and the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Transport and Communications. All areas are connected in CDM and work together.



Source: ACLED

Figure 2 Blue color shows data on protesters and red color shows data on incidents of armed conflict

After the crushing of the protests, the protesters made various efforts to increase and maintain the CDM movement. Not only enticing civil servants and rewarding CDM participants, but they also used coercive approaches such as social punishment campaigns. Civil servants lead the social punishment campaign from the CDM and a generation of tech-savvy youth. These campaigns run on social media such as Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, identifying and shaming those refusing to join the CDM, supporters and relatives of military officers, and businesses cooperating with the military. Such as the boycott action which can be said to be successful, namely the boycott on military-owned Myanmar Beer products which were previously rife, became unsold, and disappeared from the sales windows.

In addition, CRPH established "CDM Week" in the second week of February to increase CDM participation and started collecting donations from the public through the "We Pledge CDM Myanmar" website. The CRPH and CDM support team on social media pages stated that each participant receives a monthly payment of 50,000 to 100,000 Kyat (AUD 50 to 100). According to the CRPH statement, most financial support was obtained from the Myanmar diaspora community abroad, such as in the United States, Britain, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.

Apart from the support initiated by CRPH, another program to support CDM conducted by the people of Myanmar emerged in February. Charitable groups and civil society organizations, including religious organizations, do most fundraising. Fundraising carried out is the One to One CDM campaign and the Wine Gyi Chote (WGC) campaign. In the One to One CDM campaign, individuals or groups make regular one-word donations to fundraisers. Organizers of the campaign announced that 1,786 CDM members had received monthly allowances since February. However, the funds coming into One to One gradually reduced starting in May.

The chart above shows that the number of movement participants decreased from the start of the movement to mid-2022. The decreased number of movement participants was due to massive acts of violence carried out by the military against demonstrators, even civilians who had not experienced similar acts of violence.

People's Defense Force (PDF)

The People's Defense Force (PDF) is a general term for three types of armed groups that emerged after the coup, namely PDF, Local Defense Force (LDF), and People's Defense Team (PaKhaPha/PDT). A PDF is a larger armed unit formed or recognized by the National Unity Government (NUG), which is a shadow or provisional civilian government formed primarily by democratically elected members of parliament (Simion, 2021)(Simion, 2023). PDF becomes part of the government mechanism and remains under the administration of the Ministry of Defence. As non-violent methods of resistance have become very dangerous for many people due to the Sit-Tat crackdown, PDF, LDF, and PDT have now become the center of the resistance movement.

The PDF movement partially operates under a joint command set up by the NUG and several Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO). The PDF in ethnic areas is operationally commanded by or affiliated with the EAO; for example, the KPDF is under the command of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the CDF is under the control of the China and Joint Defense Committee (CJDC), and the KNDF is closely affiliated with the Karennu Army (KA) from the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) (USIP, November 3, 2022).

The formation of the PDF in April 2021, many see them as a hastily organized youth group, which upon its formation, would soon be attacked by the junta's military forces known as Sit-Tat. This is because most PDF members do not have military experience and lack war equipment and instruments to organize movements. Especially in terms of the availability of weapons, PDF has difficulty obtaining weapons, especially in the central

region such as Sagaing and Magwe, so fighting using homemade weapons is not a solution. Then they switched to producing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are considered successful in guerrilla warfare because the assembly is relatively simple and inexpensive.

The Chin, Sagaing, and Magwe states area, which includes Karen, Kachin, and Karenni states, has adopted a highly effective tactical technique of laying a series of IEDs along the route and detonating them all at once when the enemy enters the kill zone. The tactic is known as the "Padaeda Mine," which refers to a series of explosives connected and detonating all at once and can injure the junta's troops.

According to some social media, PDF progressed from making raw firearms to assembling explosives and mines by learning from YouToube and exchanging knowledge among themselves. They claim that in May, PDF Yinmabin in the Sagaing region could mount a long-range artillery system with a range of about nine miles. This was reportedly used on May 12 while advancing on the town of Sagaing Kani, with artillery fire in a single strike killing around 10 Junta soldiers as they targeted a bunker.

Several PDFs also joined the EAO in sophisticated operations against the military, especially in the ethnic areas of Chin, Kachin, Kayah, and Kayin states. Some PDFs may also come under the operational control of local EAOs equipped and armed by them. After the military crackdown on civilians protesting with rampant violence, thousands of young people quickly formed defense teams, while others slipped away to remote rural areas to join the PDF. Mainly in the states of Kachin, Kayin, and Kayah, to carry out military training and equipment.

Apart from taking the fight against military attacks on civilians, the PDF has also been determined to target military-affiliated officials. On September 7, the NUG proclaimed the day to stand against the military regime. The two essential operations carried out were the attempted murder of the deputy head of the Central Bank in Yangon, who suffered a gunshot

wound after the attack. In addition, it also assassinated the CFO of MyTel, the largest military-linked telecommunications company, and then destroyed several telecommunications towers scattered throughout the Sagaing area and Chin state. Attacks targeting military-linked officials and companies were carried out to deprive the military of revenue.




Figure 3. by acleddata.com: Military responded to the PDF movement 2021 - 2022

Based on Figure 3, In response to increased armed resistance, the army has also increased its use of remote force, often including airstrikes and shelling, and the number of incidents in the first half of 2021 has nearly doubled over the year. Existing cooperation strengthen PDF and improve its combat effectiveness. This is especially evident in the Sagaing and Kayah regions, where coalition building and coordination of the various PDFs pose significant challenges for the country's military. Changes in battle tactics, such as increased use of land mines, have weighed heavily on the junta's forces. Recent PDF images and video footage also show that some troops have acquired more advanced weaponry, such as machine guns and RPG launchers, although in limited quantities. Most of these devices come

via the black market in China, Laos, and Thailand or are manufactured locally by some EAOs and increasingly by NUG and PDF (Hein & Myers, 2021).

PDF has gradually become more powerful and organized over time. PDF has conducted various operations, including ambushes, skirmishes, bombings, sabotaging military-related businesses and facilities, and targeted assassinations. Eight months after the coup, the PDF, LDF, and PDT transformed from a fragmented, decentralized, and localized resistance force to a more organized military force. Even the combined PDF and EAO troops in the northwestern and southeastern parts of Myanmar continued to advance into areas previously controlled by the SAC (the State Administrative Council). In the northwestern region, Chin National Front (CNF) and Chinland Defense Force (CDF) cooperate with local PDFs in the Magway and Sagaing divisions, except the cities of Hakha and Tongzang. The CNF and CDF claim to have taken control of all of Chin state, parts of Magway and Sagaing divisions. Meanwhile, in the northeast, the Kachin Independence Army joined forces with the local PDF's Sagaing division to push back the SAC and gain control of the new territory.

PDF has grown massively in size, organization, and capabilities over the last year and a half, posing a threat to the junta. PDF increased nationwide in 2022, estimated to have grown to more than 250 units with more than 65,000 troops. Although many militia groups and units under the PDF framework do not have the same commander or command structure, they share the same aspirations to drive the military from power.

With strong public support and increasingly close coordination with Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO), they have thrived despite the genocide of the Russian armed junta and backed China with decades of combat experience who have no qualms about cracking down on civil society.

Model of the Myanmar Civil Society Movement

The people of Myanmar carried out the movement after the military coup in 2021, and it was initiated by a movement carried out by the community by protesting and followed by an act of defiance (Civil Disobedience Movement). The refusal was made by not working until resigning from the workplace, protesting peacefully, and using social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to be used as a forum for carrying out actions against the junta and showing how the military carried out acts of violence against civilians who carried out protests.

The CDM movement in Myanmar is grassroots (grassroots movement) because it is carried out and self-organized to encourage other community members to participate in activities such as conducting campaigns, not going to work, organizing larger protests and marches, to utilizing online social media. By utilizing local, national, and international support to realize policy changes at the local, national, and international levels, the grassroots movement carried out by Myanmar's civil society is a bottom-up effort. The bottom-up approach emphasizes active community participation, grassroots movements, and local decision-making.

A similar analysis has been carried out by (Srinivas, February 2018) in a book review entitled *Social Movements from the Bottom-up: Diversity, Identity, and Participation in the Shetkari Sanghatana Movement*. The author shows how movement mobilization can be accepted by lower castes, rural communities, and uneducated people until the movement with Sharad Joshi as the head of the movement's mobility strategy becomes India's most organized and influential agrarian movement. So this does not rule out the possibility that the existence of a movement carried out by the people of Myanmar with the CDM indicates that there has been a movement that started from the bottom up carried out by civil society in a peaceful way to reject a military coup since 2021.

Besides, the People's Defense Force (PDF) has a different background and movement mobilization than Civil Disobedience. The presence of the PDF by NUG as a shadow government of Myanmar to overthrow the military and re-establishing a democratic government by fighting military violence using weapons. PDF is a model of top-down movement based on the background of its formation. In contrast to the bottom-up approach, the top-down approach emphasizes lobbying and negotiating with decision-making authorities on various platforms that gain support from the government, building pressure through various campaign mechanisms, and so on. (Panda, 2007) Even so, the PDF movement has spread and joined various EAOs in several Myanmar states, which then carried out training to carry out joint movements to achieve the same goal.

From the chart figure 4, it can be concluded that there are two models of civil society movement in Myanmar after the military coup in 2021, namely the bottom-up movement carried out by a combination of civil society carrying out disobedience or the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) with actions taking to the streets, giving speeches, and spreading information related to what is currently happening in Myanmar through online social media. Apart from that, a movement also occurred and was carried out from the top down by NUG as the shadow government of Myanmar after the Myanmar military coup by forming the People Defense Force (PDF) to fight violence perpetrated by the military. The movement that inspired both models has the same movement relation pattern but a different movement pattern. The CDM has appeared since the beginning of Myanmar's military coup, followed by the foundation of the PDF. Following the increasingly difficult conditions that befell demonstrators in the streets and the blocking of internet access, there were signs of a stalemate in the community's movement. Those that maintained the campaign, however, targeted suburban regions in Myanmar and have survived. Despite having the same purpose, the two movement models do not complement each other. This shows that with the same problem,

two different models of civil society movements can exist. Those movements, namely CDM as a bottom-up movement model and PDF as a top-down movement model in Myanmar to resist the post-military coup Myanmar 2021. Even though both have different backgrounds of formation, mobilization, and movement patterns, CDM and PDF have the same goal: to reject the military coup and restore democracy in Myanmar.




Figure 4. Model of the civil society movement post-military coup Myanmar 2021

CONCLUSION

Today's Social Movements vary in nature, size, and operations and employ various appropriate strategies to achieve their goals. Civil society's rejection of the Myanmar military coup in 2021 has mobilized all of Myanmar's civil society from various backgrounds, including the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), which is a general strike mobilization spearheaded by a

combination of civil labor groups, medical workers, which is then followed by civil society. Which later became the model of a bottom-up movement and the People Defense Force (PDF), a larger armed unit formed or recognized by the National Unity Government (NUG) as a top-down movement. The emergence of these two movement models in rejecting the Myanmar military coup has shown that movement does not always start from the bottom up and vice versa. So it can be concluded that the same problem can give birth to two different forms of response but have the same goal to overcome these problems.

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